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On
April 14, 2008, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS")
posted on its website the proposed Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems ("IPPS")
and Fiscal Year 2009 Rates (the "proposed rule"). The proposed rule was
published in the Federal Register on April 30. Comments concerning the
proposed rule are due no later than 5:00 p.m. EDT on June 13, 2008. Included
were proposed changes to the physician self-referral ("Stark") rules
confirming CMS's statements that it will continue to use the annual IPPS
rule as a vehicle for announcing future Stark changes.
The
purpose of this article is to describe CMS's proposed Stark changes.
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Definitions of "Physician" and "Physician Organization"
CMS proposes revising the definitions of
"physicians" and "physician organization" to clarify that (1) a physician
and the professional corporation ("PC") of which he or she is the sole owner
are always treated as one unit for purposes of applying the physician
self-referral rules; and (2) a physician who stands in the shoes of his or
her wholly-owned PC also stands in the shoes of his or her physician
organization (if the physician or PC is a member of a physician
organization) in accordance with the physician "stand in the shoes"
provisions.
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"Stand in the Shoes" Rules
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Stand
in the Shoes - Physician
In Stark II, Phase III, CMS introduced the
concept of a referring physician "standing in the shoes" of his or her
physician organization (the "physician SIS provisions"). Under this concept,
when determining whether a direct or indirect compensation arrangement
exists, CMS collapses the relationship between a referring physician and his
or her physician organization, and the referring physician is considered to
have the same compensation arrangements with the same parties and on the
same terms as the physician organization. Thus, for example, if a hospital
contracted with a physician organization to provide medical director
services, and the physician organization employed or contracted with a
physician to provide the services, the arrangement would be analyzed as a
direct compensation arrangement between the hospital and the physician,
rather than an as indirect compensation arrangement. The result is that many
more hospital/physician relationships will have to meet the more stringent
requirements of the direct compensation exceptions.
Following the publication of Phase III, CMS
received comments from representatives of academic medical centers and
integrated health care delivery systems concerning the application of the
physician SIS provision to compensation arrangements involving support
payments from parent organizations to subsidiary physician organizations.
The commenters argued that prior to Phase III, the support payments did not
implicate the Stark rule because they did not meet the definition of an
indirect compensation arrangement. But, under the physician SIS provision,
the support payments resulted in direct compensation arrangements between
the parent entity and the physicians employed or contracting with the
subsidiary physician organization. To provide CMS sufficient time to examine
this issue, on November 15, 2007, CMS issued a final rule delaying the
effective date of the physician SIS provision until December 4, 2008 with
regard to compensation arrangements between a faculty practice plan and
another component of the same academic medical center and compensation
arrangements between an affiliated DHS entity and an affiliated physician
practice in the same integrated section 501(c)(3) health care system.
In the proposed rule, CMS offers two
alternative approaches to applying the physician SIS provision to support
payments. Under the first alternative, for which CMS proposes regulatory
text, a physician would not be deemed to stand in the shoes of his or her
physician organization if the compensation arrangement between the physician
and the physician organization meets the requirements of the bona fide
employment exception, the personal services arrangement exception or the
fair market value exception. Physician owners and investors would continue
to stand in the shoes of their physician organizations, however, as would
members of a group practice whose compensation arrangements fall under the
in-office ancillary services exception.
Under the second alternative, for which no
regulatory text is proposed, CMS would not revise the physician SIS
provision, but would instead create a separate exception applicable to
specific types of "nonabusive" support payments, subject to conditions
necessary to protect against program and patient abuse. CMS solicits
comments on how it should define such support payments, what criteria such
an exception should include, and what types of parties should be permitted
to use the exception.
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Stand
in the Shoes – DHS Entity
In the July 2007 proposed Medicare Physician
Fee Schedule ("MPFS"), CMS proposed a requirement that, if an entity
providing designated health services (a "DHS entity") owns or controls an
entity to which a physician refers Medicare patients for DHS, the DHS entity
would stand in the shoes of the subsidiary entity and would be deemed to
have the same compensation arrangements with the same parties and on the
same terms as the subsidiary entity (the "DHS entity SIS provision").
Commenters responding to this proposal argued that the standard was unclear
and potentially overly broad, and requested guidance concerning the level of
ownership or control that would trigger the application of the DHS entity
SIS provision.
CMS did not finalize this standard in the
final 2008 MPFS. Rather, CMS is now re-proposing the DHS entity SIS
provision with some modifications. Under the new proposal, a DHS entity
would be deemed to stand in the shoes of an organization in which it has a
100 percent ownership interest. In contrast to the proposed MPFS proposal,
the new proposal would require that the DHS entity stand in the shoes of any
wholly-owned organization regardless of whether that organization provides
DHS.
CMS requests comments as to whether the
standard should apply to other organizations in which the DHS entity holds
less than a 100 percent ownership interest and, if so, what amount of
ownership should trigger application of the DHS entity SIS provision. CMS
also seeks comments on whether a DHS entity should stand in the shoes of an
organization it "controls" (defined as having the power, directly or
indirectly, significantly to influence or direct the actions or policies of
the organization), and on what level of control should trigger application
of the standard.
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Application of Both "Stand in the Shoes" Provisions
In addition to refining its "stand in the
shoes" provisions, CMS proposes to follow the following "conventions" in
applying these standards to a chain of financial relationships:
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Generally, in analyzing a chain of
financial arrangements, CMS would first apply the physician SIS
provision to the relationship between the physician and his or her
physician organization.
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However, if applying the physician SIS
provision would result in only one financial relationship between the
DHS entity and the "collapsed" physician/organization and
that relationship is an ownership interest, CMS would not
apply the physician SIS provision. Rather, CMS would first apply the DHS
entity SIS provision.
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If applying the physician SIS provision
results in more than two links remaining in the chain of financial
relationships, CMS would then apply the DHS entity SIS provision.
CMS is not currently proposing regulation text
with regard to these conventions. When the provisions are finalized, CMS
will amend the regulatory text as necessary to codify these conventions.
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Period of Disallowance
In response to the Phase II rule, several
commenters questioned what the time period would be for which a physician
could not refer patients for DHS to an entity and for which the entity could
not bill Medicare if a financial relationship between a referring physician
and a DHS entity failed to satisfy a Stark exception (the "period of
disallowance"). CMS is proposing to establish outer limits in certain cases
for the period of disallowance depending on whether failure to meet a Stark
exception is (1) not related to compensation, (2) related to excess
compensation or (3) related to insufficient compensation.
Where the reason a financial relationship does
not meet a Stark exception is not related to compensation (e.g.,
signature is missing on a contract), the period of disallowance would begin
on the date the arrangement first was out of compliance and end no later
than the date the arrangement was brought into compliance. CMS is proposing
that where the reason a financial relationship does not meet an applicable
Stark exception is related to the payment or receipt of excess compensation
(e.g., a medical director is paid an hourly rate above fair market
value), the period of disallowance would begin on the date the arrangement
first was out of compliance and end no later than the date the excess
compensation (including interest on the excess compensation) was returned by
the party receiving it to the party that provided it and all other
requirements of the applicable Stark exception are met. Where the reason a
financial relationship does not meet an applicable Stark exception is
related to the payment or receipt of compensation that is insufficient to
satisfy the requirements of a Stark exception (e.g., physician pays
hospital lessor a rental rate for office space that is below fair market
value), CMS is proposing that the period of disallowance would begin on the
date the arrangement first was out of compliance and ends no later than the
date the shortfall was paid to the party to which it is owed, and all other
requirements of the applicable Stark exception are met. The "shortfall"
would be the amount (including interest) necessary to bring the arrangement
into compliance from the date of its inception. Although CMS is proposing
specific rules for determining the period of disallowance, CMS emphasized
that certain arrangements would still have to be analyzed on a case-by-case
basis.
CMS notes in its proposed rule that it is only
placing outside limits on the period of disallowance for making referrals
and billing the Medicare program in the case of certain noncompliant
financial relationships. CMS expressly states that these periods of
disallowance do not address whether the Anti-Kickback statute is implicated
and/or whether civil monetary penalties under the physician self-referral
statute are potentially applicable due to noncompliant financial
relationships.
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Gainsharing Arrangements
Gainsharing programs are designed to provide
incentives to physicians to assist hospitals in controlling hospitals' costs
of patient care by financially rewarding physicians with a share of saved
costs. Incentives provided to physicians under a gainsharing arrangement are
considered a financial relationship for Stark purposes, and thus, would
prohibit a physician from referring a patient to an entity for the
furnishing of a DHS unless the financial relationship meets the requirements
of a specific Stark exception.
Although recognizing the numerous favorable
OIG gainsharing advisory opinions, CMS and Congressionally approved
demonstration projects and the value gainsharing arrangements could bring to
the Medicare program through reduced program costs, CMS declined to issue a
specific exception to Stark for gainsharing arrangements in the proposed
rule. The Stark statute grants CMS the authority to issue additional
exceptions, but only if such exceptions create no risk of abuse to patients
or the Medicare program.
CMS announced, however, that it is interested
in receiving comments regarding an exception for gainsharing arrangements
addressing (1) what types of requirements and safeguards should be included
in any exception, and (2) whether certain services, clinical protocols or
other arrangements should not qualify for the exception.
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Physician-Owned Implant and Other
Medical Device Companies
CMS's request for comments regarding whether
the Stark rule should address physician-owned implant and medical device
companies (POCs) reflects a rising concern regarding physician investment in
these manufacturing, distribution and purchasing companies. Physicians'
financial incentives from ownership, according to CMS, may "foster an
anti-competitive climate, raise quality of care concerns and lead to
over-utilization of the device or other product to which the physician is
linked."
Regulators' concern as to physician investment
in POCs was earlier evidenced in the OIG's October 6, 2006 letter on the
same topic and, more recently, when CMS proposed to revise the definition of
"entity" in its CY 2008 Physician Fee Schedule proposed rule. When CMS
proposed to include in the definition an entity that "causes" a claim to be
submitted to Medicare, commenters questioned whether a physician-owned
implant or other medical device company would be considered a "entity," as
arguably, a manufacturer could be considered an "entity" using that
definition.
In the proposed Stark rules, CMS requests
comments concerning whether Stark should address POCs and other
physician-owned companies or whether these organizations could be addressed
through False Claims Act enforcement, the Anti-Kickback law, other public
laws and through federal, state and local regulations. CMS specifically
asks: (i) whether physician ownership in POCs and other organizations
presents risks of over-utilization, substandard care and increased costs to
Medicare beneficiaries or whether the risk is limited to anti-competitive
behavior; and (ii) if the answer to (i) is "yes," CMS asks for suggestions
of specific actions to take, including whether POCs should be considered DHS
entities under particular circumstances, whether physician investors in POCs
who influence a hospital's ordering of medical devices should be considered
to have a direct compensation relationship with the hospital and whether
certain investment interests should be excepted from Medicare coverage.
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Financial Relationships between
Hospitals and Physicians; Disclosure and Enforcement
Stark requires DHS entities to provide the
Secretary with information concerning a DHS entity's ownership, investment
and compensation arrangements. CMS has been working on a form for the
required reporting since the 1991 Stark I final rule. In the 2004 Stark II
Phase II final rule, CMS removed all references to a prescribed form and
required DHS entities to provide the required information only upon request.
The IPPS proposed rule does not propose to
revise the current Stark rule. In the preamble, however, CMS unveils its
proposed new information collection instrument, the Disclosure of Financial
Relationships Report ("DFRR").
The genesis of the DFRR dates back to the
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which required CMS to develop a plan to
address certain issues relating to physician-owned specialty hospitals. In
its report to Congress with information gathered from a survey of 130
specialty hospitals and 220 competitor hospitals, CMS announced its plan to
require all hospitals to provide information on a periodic basis about
physicians' investment interests in and compensation arrangements with the
hospitals. CMS has created the DFRR as part of its implementation of that
disclosure process.
CMS proposes to send the DFRR to 500
hospitals, which is between 8 and 10 percent of all Medicare-participating
hospitals. CMS will use the information from the DFRRs to determine
hospitals' compliance with Stark and to assist CMS in any future rulemaking
regarding reporting requirements and other Stark provisions. The DFRR also
may assist CMS in deciding whether to propose a rule requiring an annual, or
other periodic, disclosure by all hospitals.
CMS proposes that the DFRR be completed,
certified by the appropriate hospital official and received by CMS within 60
days. Although Stark gives CMS the authority to impose a civil monetary
penalty of up to $10,000 for each day a report is past due, CMS will not
seek to invoke this authority, but will work with hospitals to comply with
the reporting requirements.
The proposed DFRR can be found in Appendix C
of the proposed IPPS rule. In addition to information about physician
investors, all hospitals must disclose information about compensation
arrangements with physicians. Worksheet 7 requests information about the
following compensation arrangements: rental of office space, rental of
equipment, personal service arrangements and physician recruitment. The
information requested in Worksheet 8 includes isolated transactions with a
physician, charitable donations and "any non-monetary compensation and/or
medical staff incidental benefits granted to a physician that exceeded
published limits." It should be noted that the proposed DFRR requests
information from a hospital’s cost reporting period ending in 2006.
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Conclusion
CMS has stated that it intends to use the
annual IPPS rule as a vehicle for future changes to the Stark regulations,
reflecting a change from its prior practice of issuing large scale changes
to the regulations in separately published documents, such as the Stark II
Phase III rule issued in September 2007. Although likely to result in
significant impact to the relationships between DHS entities and physicians,
the regulatory changes proposed in the proposed IPPS rule are more limited
in scope than previous issuances. Interestingly, the proposed rule does not
refer to the majority of Stark changes proposed in the CY 2008 proposed MPFS
but abandoned in the final MPFS, indicating that hospitals and other health
care providers may see additional changes to the Stark rules in the coming
year.
If you
have questions, please
contact one of the Phelps Dunbar health care attorneys listed below. |