Florida Supreme Court Answers Certified Question Regarding Scope of Insured Status
January 18, 2008
The Florida Supreme Court, addressing a certified question from the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, concluded that the phrase "any other person with respect to liability because of acts or omissions of" the named insured is unambiguous and limits an additional insured's coverage only to its vicarious liability for the named insured's conduct. Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2007 WL 3101820 (Fla. Oct. 25, 2007).
The insured and a regular permissive user of the insured's auto (a caregiver for the insured's mother-in-law) were sued by a pedestrian struck by the permissive user while operating the auto. The complaint alleged that each were independently negligence in failing to maintain the vehicle. The caregiver settled with the victim and then sought coverage from the insurer, arguing that she qualified as "any other person or organization with respect to liability because of acts or omissions" of the insured. The insured's policy defined a covered person as "[y]ou or a family member; any other person or organization with respect to liability because of acts or omissions of you or a family member; or any combination of the above." The insurer denied her claim, arguing that the policy covered only individuals who become vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of the named insured. Because the victim sued the caregiver for her own negligent acts, and not for any acts or omissions of the insured, the insurer concluded that she did not qualify as an insured. The caregiver sued the insurer seeking a declaration that she was a "covered person" under the policy, but the district court held that she was not a "covered person" under the policy claims involving her own negligence. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Court held that the words "any other person or organization with respect to liability because of acts or omissions of" the named insured clearly indicate that one is an insured (and entitled to coverage) only for liability caused by or occurred by reason of acts of omissions of the named insured, which the Supreme Court took to mean that such person's liability must be caused by the acts or omissions, i.e., negligence, of the named insured, not that person's liability arising from his or her own negligent acts. Thus, because the suit against the caregiver sought recovery only for her direct negligence, the Supreme Court held she was not entitled to coverage.